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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE 0'F UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
-vs.I~UBEN

Case
No. 9298

B. SANCHEZ,
Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent notes that appellant's statement of fact
is in reality argumentative in that at page 4 in particular, and elsewhere, such language as "but no evidence was
shown to prove she had been raped,'' attempts to state
the legal implications of testimony. Further, the appellant's statement of fact is not complete and respondent
shall make reference in the course of its brief to such
necessary additional facts as are relevant to this appeal.
1
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT I.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF
PENETRATION BEFORE THE JURY TO
JUSTIFY A VERDICT OF GUILTY, AND THE
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY.
PoiNT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF DR.
McENTIRE.
PoiNT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN DETERMINING THE PROSECUTRIX TO
BE A COMPETENT WITNESS, AND IN ADMITTING HER TESTIMONY.
PoiNT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF AUGUST NUSSBAUM, HAROLD GIBBS ANDREBECCA GARCIA, OR IF SUCH ADMISSIONS
WERE ERROR, SUCH ERROR WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT I.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF
PENETRATION BEFORE THE JURY TO
JUSTIFY A VERDICT OF GUILTY, AND THE
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY.
2
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In spite of the conceded fact that no motion to
disn1iHH or motion for directed verdict was made on defendant's behalf at the trial of this action, counsel for
dPfendant-appellant, under the" palpable error" doctrine
of the State v. Cabo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 92, wishes this
Court to rule as though some such motion had timely
been made.
Assuming either motion had been made, respondent
contends the trial court would have had no alternative
but to deny it. This Court has repeatedly announced
the standard on which such motions are to be considered.
lYiost recently in the case of State v. Iverson, ______ Utah
________ , 350 P. 2d 152, this Court, over the signature of
Justice Callister, said :
"The law involved is ably discussed in the opinion of Justice Wolfe in State v. Thatcher, 108
Utah 63, 157 P. 2d 258. The controlling principle
is that upon such a motion the evidence is to be
viewed most favorably to the state, and if when so
viewed, the jury acting fairly and reasonably
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge is required to submit the case
to the jury for determination of the guilt or innocence of defendant."
In the case of State v. Penderville, 2 U. 2d 281, 272
P. 2d 195, the court said :

'' * * * It has been repeatedly held by this court
that upon a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict
of not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial
court does not consider the weight of the evidence
or credibility of the witnesses, but determines the
naked legal proposition of law, whether there is
3
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any substantial evidence of the guilt of the
accused, and all reasonable inferences are to be
taken in favor of the state. * * * (Cases cited)
. .l\_s is pointed out in one or more of these cases,
the trial court has a discretion in the case of a
motion for a new trial that it does not have in case
of a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict of not
guilty. Nevertheless, in either case if there is before the court evidence upon which reasonable
men might differ as to whether the defendant is or
is not guilty, he may deny the motion."
In the case of State v. Lewellyn, 71 Utah 331, 366
Pac. 261, an adultery prosecution where defendant made
a motion for a directed verdict, which motion is equivalent to the motion to dismiss under consideration here,
the court said :
"In 16 C. J. 935, the conclusions of various courts
are condensed in the statement:
'' 'As a general rule the court should direct a verdict of acquittal * * * where there is no competent
evidence reasonably tending to sustain the charge;
or were the evidence is undisputed and so weak
that a conviction would be attributable to passion
or prejudice, or where it is so. slight and indeterminate that a verdict of guilty would be set a.side,
as where the evidence consists solely of the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, or is insufficient to overcome the preumption of innocence, or
to show defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. But the case should be submitted to the jury
and the court should not direct a verdict of acquittal, if there is any evidence to support or reasonably tending to support the charge, as where it is
sufficient to overcome prima facie the presumption
of innocence, or where the evidence of a material
nature is conflicting.'
4
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''From Pace v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 560, 186
S.W. 142, we quote the syllabus on this point as
follows:
'' 'It is only in the absence of any evidence tending
to establish the guilt of the accused that the trial
court will be authorized to grant a peremptory instruction directing his acquittal.'
''The same principle is decided in State v. Gross,
Ohio St. 161, 110 N.E. 466.
''An able discussion and determination of the
bounds of judicial authority in considering a motion for a directed verdict is contained in Isbell v.
U.S. 142 C.C.A. 312, 227 F. 788, in which it is made
clear that the court in such case does not consider
the weight of evidence or credibility of witnesses
but determines the naked legal proposition of law
whether there is any substantial evidence of the
guilt of the accused. This is undoubtedly the correct rule. See annotation 'Directing Acquittal,'
17 A.L.R. 910. The function of a court in dealing
with an application for a directed verdict must not
be confused with that in considering a motion for
a new trial upon the grounds of insufficiency of
evidence. The court has a discretion in the latter
case which he does not properly have in the former. The reason for the distinction is that the
order sought in one case acquits the accused and
finally ends the prosecution, while in the other,
the order, if granted, does not discharge the
accused but merely gives him the advantage and
benefit of another trial. The rule is controlled
by the same principles in criminal cases as in civil
procedure. And in a civil case, Starn v. Ogden
P. & P. Co., 53 Utah 248, 177 P. 218, this court·
said:
" 'It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction and
perhaps in nearly every other where the jury sys5
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tern prevails, that, if there is any substantial evidence whatever upon which to base a verdict, the
court will not withdraw the case from the jury or
direct what their verdict should be.' "
In the case at bar there is ''substantial evidence'' of
penetration from which the jury could properly have
returned a verdict of guilty. The prosecuting witness
testified about two specific events of intercourse. Counsel for appellant, in his brief, cites part of the testimony
relating to each event. The entire testimony of the prosecuting witness regarding the same follows:

''Q. Now you tell us what happened then.
A. Well, I had a dress on, and he tore it off me.
And then he put me on the bed, and he got on
top of me, and he put his penis in me.
Q. What do you mean by that~ Would you tell
me what you mean by that~ Could you tell us
what he did to you Y
A. Well, he got his penis, and put it between my
legs.
Q. Pardon me~
A. He put his penis between my legs.
Q. And then what did he do~
A. Then he went up and down.

Q. And do you know \Yhether he was- You say
that he put it inside of you. How do you know
it was inside of you, Beverly~
A. Because it hurt.
Q. And tell us what happened then~
A. Well, he went up and do\Yn on me, and it hurt.
I was screaming, and \Yhen he got through
there wa.s something sticky between my legs.
6
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Q. Did you tell your mother about
A. No. I was too scared.

this~

Q. Now what did Ruben Sanchez do then? After
you felt the sticky between your legs, what
happened then?
A. Well, then he done it for awhile, and he got
through and he put his clothes on and he went
out, and he told me to don't tell.
Q. He told you what~
A. He told me to don't tell. And I said okay, so
then he unlocked the doors and he went out.
Q. Now did you see Ruben Sanchez again, after
this first day~
A. Yes.
Q. And tell us if you ever saw Ruben Sanchez
again at your home, when your mother wasn't
there.
A. Well, she went out, and he came over again,
and he brought some men.
THE
THE
THE
THE

CouRT: Brought some
WITNESS: Men.
CouRT: Men~
WITNEss: Yes.

what~

MR. NEWEY: Q. What happened

then~

A. Well, they came in our house. And me and
my sister, we were cleaning the house up, and
he brought the men in, and they took my sister,
they were taking turns with her, and Ruben
Sanchez was with me in the other room.

Q. Tell me now - particularly with you, if you
would, Beverly - what did Ruben Sanchez do
to you at that particular time ~
A. Well, he took me in the other room and put me
on the bed, and told me to take my clothes off,
7
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and I wouldn't, so he pulled up my dress and
pulled down my pants, and he took his clothes
off, and I was screaming and I wouldn't let
him, so then he kept doing it to me. He opened
my legs.

Q. He kept what~
A. He kept doing it to me. He opened up my legs,
and put his penis in me.
Q. And would you tell us what he did then 1
A. Then he went up and down on me.
Q. He did what?
A. He went up and down on me.
Q. All right.
A_. And I was screaming it hurt, so kept d_~¥ it.
When he got through it hurt, and ;fie got
through he put his clothes on and he went in
the other room, and he told me and sister to
don't tell. When the other men got through
with my sister, he told me and my sister to
don't tell. When the men was through with
my sister.'' (R. 19-21)
On cross-examination the prosecuting witness was
asked:

"Q. Now you told us, Beverly, that Mr. Sanchez
was inside of you. Are you sure that he was
inside of you 1
A. Yes.

Q. Now are you sure that it was Mr. Sanchez and
not one of the other men that was inside of you 1
A. It was Mr. Sanchez.
Q. Do you remember for a certainty 1
A. Yes." (R. 30)
8
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As cited by appellant in his brief, Section 76-53-17,
U.C.A. 1953 provides:
''Any sexual penetration, however slight, is
sufficient to complete the crime.''
While this section has never been formally construed by
this Court, a similar statute of almost identical words in
the State of Washington was construed in the case of
State v. Snyder, 91 P. 2d 570, wherein the court said:
'' * * * Some statutes expressly provide that any
sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
complete the crime, and such a provision applies
to all the subdivisions of a statute defining the
offense. And, generally, it is not necessary that
the penetration should be perfect, the slightest
penetration of the body of the female by the sexual
organ of the male being sufficient; nor need there
be an entering of the vagina or rupturing of the
hymen; the entering of the vulva or labia is sufficient.''

The prosecuting witness's testimony, if believed, indicates the defendant was ''inside'' her and it ''hurt.''
This testimony was supplemented by the testimony of Dr.
McEntire to the effect that sexual intercourse with an·
adult male of average maturity and size would have
been possible with this girl. (R. 38-39)

II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF DR.
McENTIRE.
PoiNT

Appellant in his brief seems to argue that because
Dr. McEntire did not testify the prosecuting witness
9
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had been ''raped,'' his testimony was, therefore, irrelevant and prejudicial. The word "rape" to appellant apparently means the act of intercourse, accompanied with
force and resistance, and that unless evidence showing resistance or lack of consent and force, the crime has not
been completed in spite of the fact that counsel cites, as
noted above, the applicable statute with regard to penetration alone constituting the crime. Appellant further
contends that because the State, through the testimony
of Dr. McEntire, failed to show such force and resistance, it has failed to meet its burden of proof. As the
statute indicates, the crime is complete upon a showing
of the act of intercourse, entirely independent of consent,
force or resistance, when perpetrated on a female under
the age of 13 years (76-53-15 [1], U.C.A. 1953), and,
as indicated above, any penetration, however slight, is
sufficient demonstration of the act.
Clearly, Dr. McEntire's testimony ran solely to the
question of possibility of penetration. This is clearly
relevant and was accordingly properly admitted. In the
Snyder case cited above, the court notes that expert testimony of doctors was introduced in that trial to show that
the prosecuting witness's hymen "\Yas not punctured, but
the court upheld a conviction on the ground that sufficient
penetration of the labia. was demonstrated to justify a
guilty verdict from the jury. Since expert testimony tending to show lack of penetration is admissible, so also
should expert testimony tending to sho"\Y possibility of
penetration be admissible. The trial court committed
no error, therefore, in admitting Dr. McEntire's
testimony.

10
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PoiNT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN DETERMINING THE PROSECUTRIX TO
BE A COMPETENT WITNESS, AND IN AD~IITTING HER TESTIMONY.
1\.t Points IV, V and VII of his brief, appellant argues

that the testimony of Beverly Garcia, the complaining
\vitness, was inadmissible in its entirety for two reasons,
(1) that she was not a competent witness, and (2) that
she did not sufficiently understand the questions. Further,
appellant maintains certain specific testimony by this
'vitness should have been precluded relating to other
offenses committed by other parties than defendant at
the time of the offense charged. These three points shall
be answered under the above heading.
(A) Counsel for appellant cites the case of State v.
Zeezich, 61 Utah 61, 210 Pac. 927, in support of his position that the prosecutrix in this case was incompetent to
testify. As a rna tter of fact, the Zeezich case holds exactly
to the contrary. In that opinion, rendered by Justice
Thurman, the court enunciated the established rule 1n
this jurisdiction in the following language:
''The authorities are practically uniform to the
effect that the admission of testimony in cases of
this kind is within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and that its decision in such cases will not
be reversed unless there is a manifest abuse of
discretion. Such has been the holding of this court
in many decisions heretofore rendered. State v.
Blythe, 20 Utah, 379, 58 Pac. 1108; State v. M.orasco, 42 Utah 5, 128 Pac. 571; State v. Macmillan,
46 Utah, 19, 145 Pac. 833. There are no decisions
11
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to the contrary in this jurisdiction. Besides holding that the question of competency is within the
discretion of the trial court, these cases hold that,
not age, but mental capacity, is the test of
competency.
"In State v. Blythe, supra, at page 380 of 20 Utah,
at page 1108 of 58 Pac., it is said:
" 'Not age, but capability of receiving just impressions of facts and of relating them truly, are
the tests of competency, under the statute'
''In State v. Morasco, supra, the court states the
rule as follows :
'' 'If the child has the mental capacity to understand the obligations of an oath- that is, appreciates the difference between truth and falsehood
- is sensible of the impropriety of telling a falsehood, and that it is his duty to tell the truth, and
is capable of receiving just impressions of the
facts of which he is to testify, and has the
ability to relate them correctly, he is a competent
witness.'
''In State v. Macmillan, supra, a case in which
the offense charged and the age of the child were
the same as in the case at bar, the court, speaking
of the discretion vested in the trial court, at page
22 of 46 Utah, at page 834 of 145 Pac., says:
''It is next contended that the district court erred
in receiving the testimony of the little girl, with
whose person the indecent liberties were taken,
and who testified in behalf of the state, upon the
ground that she by reason of her youth and want
of comprehension of the solemnity of an oath, was
incompetent to testify. The question of the competency of a child who is called as a witness, in
the very nature of things, must to a large extent
at least, be left to the sound discretion of the trial
12
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court. When that court has passed upon the question either way, we cannot interfere, unless it is
clearly made to appea.r that the court abused the
discretion vested in it." (Emphasis added)
Reading the record at pages 15 through 18, there is
certainly no apparent abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court. At the conclusion, the court said :
"I think she's qualified to testify. You may go
ahead." (R. 18)
No objection was made at the time of the trial as to
this witness's competency, and from a reading of the
witness's entire testimony (R. 15-32), it is apparent that
she had sufficient mental capacity "to receive just impressions of the facts and the ability to relate them
correctly.''
(B) Counsel for appellant maintains, because of a
supposed specific example cited showing lack of comprehension in the witness, that the entire testimony of
Beverly Garcia should be excluded. In the example cited
by appellant, however, it is apparent the witness, while
not understanding the first question posed, upon its being
re-phrased, understood and responded to the question.
Again a reading of the entire testimony of this witness shows a coherence, capacity to understand and a
rational relating of the facts requested. The fact that a
given question may have needed to be re-phrased for
this 10-year-old girl is certainly no ground for error in
and of itself. As to all material facts, this witne-ss's tes-

13
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timony was unequivocal and coherent and responsive to
the questions.
No objection was made at the time of trial by defendant's counsel that this witness was failing to understand the questions, and clearly, counsel at the time of
trial had much better opportunity to observe the witness's behavior, demeanor and capacity than does this
Court or appellate counsel. There is nothing in the record
in the absence of objection to give rise to the "palpable
error'' doctrine relied on by appellant.
(C) Appellant further contends that the testimony
of the prosecutrix with regard to commission of similar
crimes by friends of defendant on prosecutrix's sister,
was prejudicial and should have been precluded by the
court.
A reading of the record, beginning at page 20, shows
the witness testified the defendant "brought some men"
with him, and that, further, "he brought the men in, and
they took my sister, they were taking turns with her and
Ruben Sanchez was ·w-ith me in the other room.'' Later
she testified :
''When he got through it hurt, and \Yhen he got
through he put his clothes on and he went in the
other room and he told me and my sister to don't
tell. When the other men got through with my
sister, he told me and my sister to don't tell. When
the men was through with my sister."

14
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On eross-examination, defendant's
asked:

own counsel

Q. Did you say prior to this time
- earlier, at the preliminary hearing, when we
\vere talking - did you mention that the men that
cnn1c in with Mr. Sanchez also had relations with
~·on, or did this same thing to you as Mr. Sanchez
has done1 Do you understand what I'm asking
"}[R. PHILLIPS:

you~

A. Yes. Yes, they done it.

Q. They did it to you, too 1
A. Yes.
Q. And when did they do this to you, Beverly1 Do
you remember 1
A. It's between the 4th of July and the 24th of
July.
Q. Now is this the same time that you have spoken
about Mr. Sanchez doing the same thing to you~
A. Yes.
Q. I see. Now how many times did those other men
do this to you 1 Do you remember 1
.A.. No.
Q. Do you remember the times that they did it1
Were they there at any time that Mr. Sanchez
was not there~
.A.. No.
Q. They were only there when Mr. Sanchez was
there~

.A.• Yes.

Q. Now then, was Mr. Sanchez there at any time
that they were not there~ Did he come alone at
any time~
A. Yes.

15
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Q. He came alone at other
A. Yes.

times~

Q. Now are you absolutely sure, Beverly, that it
was Mr. Sanchez that did these things to you,
and not some other man~
A. Yes.''
(R. 26-27)
'' Q. Now are you sure that it was Mr. Sanchez,
and not one of the other men, that was inside
of you~
A. It was Mr. Sanchez.
Q. Do you remember for a
A. Yes.''
(R. 30)

certainty~

No objection was made by defendant's counsel at the
time this first testimony was elicited on direct examination. It appears further that such testimony was part of a
description of the entire res gestae. It was well within the
bounds of propriety and relevancy in describing who was
present and what others were doing in the witness' presence at the time of the acts of the defendant.
Defense counsel, in fact, on cross-examination, further inquired into the matter with the apparent hope of
getting the prosecutrix confused as to whoilf had perpetrated the acts upon her. Having elected to explore
that possibility, appellant should not now be free to argue
that such testimony, which his own counsel helped elicit,
was inadmissible and should never have been permitted.
PoiNT

IV.

TilE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF AU-

16
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GUST NUSSBAUM, HAROLD GIBBS ANDREBECCA GARCIA, OR IF SUCH ADMISSIONS
WERE ERROR, SUCH ERROR WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL.
At Points III, VI and VIII in his brief, appellant objects to the admission of the testimony of Captain August
Nussbaum, Harold Gibbs and Rebecca Garcia, the complaining witness's mother.
(A) With regard to the testimony of Captain Nussbaum, the record discloses at pages 45 through 47 that
this witness testified concerning conversations had with
the defendant. Counsel for defendant twice objected that
such conversations were hearsay. On both occasions the
court overruled the objection. Counsel for appellant now
insists that such conversations and statements by defendant were hearsay or, if not hearsay, were admissions
which do not meet five elements requisite according to
Wharton on Criminal Evidence.
A reading of the testimony shows that the defendant
\Yas interrogated as to his acquaintance with the complaining witness and her mother and with their home.
He at first denied any acquaintance with them or knowledge of the home, and thereafter admitted knowing both
the complaining witness and her mother, and further admitted being in the home in company of other Spanish
men. This testimony is patently an admission, and the
only objection possibly available to defendant had he
raised it would be the question of voluntariness of such
admissions. Foundation for such testimony was in fact
laid (R. 45), and no objection either to the foundation or

17
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voluntariness was proffered by defense counsel. In fact,
on cross-examination of Captain Nussbaum counsel for
defense reiterated that his client admitted knowing the
complaining witness, having been in the home with her
in company of others, and emphasized that the defendant
denied "having done anything to the little girl."
The defendant later elected to take the stand, and
on direct examination admitted virtually the same facts
in his own testimony. (R. 49 and 50) On cross-examination the defendant further admitted this conversation
with Captain Nussbaum and corroborated substantially
what the Captain had testified. (R. 53 through 55) The
jury, therefore, would h~ve had the same facts out of
defendant's own mouth, even though this witness's testimony had been precluded. Therefore, defendant-appellant
was not prejudiced thereby.
(B) The testimony of the witness, Harold Gibbs, did
no more than connect, for the benefit of the jury, the
events in the life of the prosecuting witness from the
time she was living with her mother until she was placed
in the foster home where she was residing at the time of
the trial.
Section 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides that the
commission of error by the trial court will not be presumed to have resulted in prejudice unless it affects the
substantial rights of the parties. See State v. Neal, -----Utah ________ , 262 P. 2d 756. Clearly, this testimony does
not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. Indeed, counsel for appellant does not so complain but
argues only tha.t the testimony was irrelevant, imma-
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terial and improper, and tended to provoke sympathy for
the vietim, and for these reasons was prejudicial.
..L\s indicated in the Neal case cited above, the test
of prejudicial error seems to be : Would the result have
been otherwise had the testimony not been admitted~
Clearly in this instance the absence of the testimony of
Harold Gibbs would not, indeed, could not, have effected
the verdict.
(C) Appellant further objects to the admission of
the testimony of Rebecca Garcia, the mother of the complaining witness. Appellant argues that because in re~ponse to one question the witness hazarded an opinion,
to-,vit: ''and those times I think he was at the house,''
the entire testimony of the witness should have been
disallowed. While it may have been that this answer
might well have been objectionable, no objection was
timely made and, hence, no error for the same can now
be claimed. Even, however, if such an objection had
been made, quite clearly this answer, in and of itself,
could hardly be said to be so inflammatory or prejudicial
as to have affected the substantial rights of the defendant sufficient to constitute reversible error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully
requests this Court to affirm the decision of the trial
court.
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
GORDON A. MADSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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